Autor: Arribillaga Pablo, Bonifacio Agustín
Institución: Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis-UNSL-CONICET
Año: 2022
JEL: D71
Resumen:
In a classical voting problem with a finite set of (at least three) alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only and unanimous rules. Since strategy-proofness is impossible to obtain on the universal domain of (strict) preferences, we investigate the weaker concept of non-obvious manipulability (NOM). First, we show that NOM is equivalent to every veto from any agent being a strong veto. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules satisfy NOM on the universal domain of preferences.