Autor: Fossati Roman(*), González Roberto Hernan(**), Kujal Praveen(***)
Institución: (*)Universidad Nacional del Centro, (**)BSB Dijon, (***)Middlesex University Business School
Año: 2022
JEL: C9, L0, L1, L4, L11, L13
Resumen:
List-pricing and discounting is a common practice in retail and wholesale markets. Under this pricing mechanism, a posted list price is offered to sellers in a prior stage which can then de discounted at a later in a second stage. The practice of list pricing and discounting is viewed as collusive theoretically, however, its interpretation amongst competition authorities varies from being pro-competitive to being a collusion facilitating device. We experimentally test how list pricing and discounting impact prices in a capacity constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with symmetric and asymmetric firms. We find evidence of collusion under list pricing and discounting with symmetric as well as with asymmetric firms relative to a baseline case without the discounting stage.