Autor: Arozamena Leandro*, Ganuza Juan José**, Weinschelbaum Federico*
Institución: *UTDT, **Universitat Pompeu Fabra y Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
JEL: C72, D44
A sponsor -e.g. a government agency- uses a procurement auction to select a supplier who will be in charge of the execution of a contract. That contract is incomplete: it may be renegotiated once the auction's winner has been chosen. We examine a setting where one firm may bribe the agent in charge of monitoring contract execution so that the former is treated preferentially if renegotiation actually occurs. If a bribe is accepted, the corrupt firm will be more aggressive at the initial auction and thus win with a larger probability. We show that the equilibrium probability of corruption is larger when the initial contract is less complete, and when the corrupt firm's cost is more likely to be similar to her rivals'. In addition, we examine how this influences the sponsor's incentives when designing the initial contract.