Autor: Coleff Joaquín*, Pozo Alban David**
Institución: *UNLP, **Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado SCPM
JEL: L41, L13
We examine big International Hard Core Cartels with the aim to disentangle the factors associated with the duration of these collusive agreements. We utilize a database of cartels that were convicted between 2012 and 2018 (with at least one conviction issued by a competition authority) to analyze how the duration of cartels can be correlated with factors such as the number of conspirators, the enactment of a leniency law, and the utilization of leniency programs. The results from the proportional Cox model indicate that collusive agreements tend to last shorter when a Leniency Program is available, which is consistent with a dissuasion effect. However, those cartels applying to the leniency program tend to be involved in longer cartels than those that do not apply to the program. Furthermore, and maybe surprising, we do not find a negative relation between cartel duration and the number of participants. As the number of companies involved in anti competitive practices increases, the duration of the agreement also tends to rise. Finally, a higher level of effectiveness by the regulatory authority appears to be correlated with shorter durations of cartels.