Autor: Freille Sebastián
JEL: H77, P00
In this paper we study the relationship between electoral outcomes for both federal and state level executive elections. Electoral outcomes for different offices in multi-tiered systems are likely to be mutually influenced through multiple channels. We explore two of this channels in this paper: institutional design and coattail effects. Traditionally, coattail effects have been studied between executive and legislative elections for the same government level. Instead, we explore both coattail effects and vote congruence for different-level office. Using data disaggregated at the department-level comprising 5 (five) elections during 2003-2019, we examine the relationship between votes for the elected President and governor in every district. We find evidence of vote dissimilarity between elected Presidents and governors and this is particularly strong when the national executive election is contested. Elected Presidents tend to increase their district-level relative electoral strength vis-a-vis elected gobernors regardless of party and coalition. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence and insights on the characteristis of coalition-building between national and sub-national governments.